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Research Summary: Incumbent firms often reposition themselves in response to competitive entrants, but
when doing so the firm incurs repositioning costs. To model strategic interactions between incumbents
and entrants this article proposes an approach that incorporates both repositioning costs and associated
decision biases, which have been identified in the economics and strategy literatures as critical aspects
of strategic change, but have been largely ignored in game-theoretic treatments at the strategy level.
Using formal models, we analytically characterize the impacts of repositioning costs and biases on firms’
equilibrium strategies and profits. Including these costs and biases changes the nature of strategic
dynamics as well as introduces new implications for strategic choice.
Managerial Summary: In a baseline setting, where both an entrant and an incumbent are unbiased,
the incumbent’s repositioning ability can benefit the entrant, but hurt the incumbent. As a result, the
market leader’s (incumbent’s) superior repositioning ability does not necessarily create an advantage
for the leader relative to the entrant. This is true even if the entrant is biased in estimating the
incumbent’s repositioning ability and the incumbent is sophisticated (namely, aware of the entrant’s
bias and having a correct assessment of it). Indeed, when an entrant is biased, this unequivocally
reduces its own performance, but this bias can hurt the incumbent more, thus enhancing the entrant’s
relative advantage. In a similar vein, when an incumbent is biased in its estimation of the entrant, this
can actually help the incumbent’s relative advantage. Perhaps more interestingly, although entrant bias
and incumbent bias always harm the entrant and incumbent, respectively, both the entrant and the
incumbent can earn more than in our baseline setting where both firms are unbiased. Furthermore, as
opposed to the case where the incumbent is unaware of entrant bias, the incumbent is not necessarily
better off being less biased, i.e., aware, but with an inaccurate assessment, of entrant bias. Interestingly,
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both the incumbent and the entrant can be harmed by the incumbent’s reduced bias.
Keywords: repositioning costs, overestimation, underestimation, behavioral strategy, awareness.
Introduction
Entrants have repeatedly been identified as one important determinant of the market dynamic, especially
the profitability of incumbents (Bain, 1956; Kumar and Sudharshan, 1988; Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991;
Simon, 2005; Berry and Reiss, 2007; McCann and Vroom, 2010). Incumbents can be affected, for
instance, when entrants attempt to penetrate the market by reducing prices, which in effect intensifies
competition among firms (Rumelt and Teece, 1994; Chen, 1996; Simon, 2005; Besanko et al., 2009;
McCann and Vroom, 2010). To avoid confrontation that could lead to destructive price wars, incumbent
firms often reposition their products or brands, especially in industries with low barriers to entry (Trout
and Ries, 1982; Smiley, 1988; Carpenter, 1989; Hauser and Shugan, 2008; Ellickson et al., 2012). One
well-known example of repositioning is Johnson & Johnson’s Tylenol brand of analgesics. Tylenol once
dominated the over-the-counter market for pain relief by establishing the drug as effective with few
side effects. After its competitor Advil entered the market in 1984, Tylenol revised its marketing to
emphasize Tylenol’s gentleness (Hauser and Shugan, 2008). Another example is the shift in pricing
format of US local retailers in response to the entry of Walmart in the 1990s (Ellickson et al., 2012).
While repositioning can be advantageous, it may come at a cost because past strategic decisions,
which often require prior commitments (Ghemawat 1991), may need to be changed. The costs associat-
ed with this repositioning (“repositioning costs”) typically include investments to overcome within-firm
managerial resistance to change, to rework channel relationships, and to educate (or advertise to) con-
sumers about the new positioning (Menon and Yao, 2017). Repositioning costs have substantial implica-
tions for the competitive interplay between firms (Ellickson et al., 2012; Wang and Shaver, 2014, 2016).
Consider the case of Mobileye (Yoffie, 2014), a technology leader in vision technologies for advanced
driver assistance systems (ADAS), which was highlighted in Menon and Yao (2017, page 1954):
Rather than selling its technologies directly to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs),
Mobileye initially partnered with Tier 1 automotive suppliers such as TRW and Autoliv who,
in turn, sold the OEMs integrated ADAS using Mobileye and non-Mobileye vision technolo-
gies. Mobileye subsequently instituted an exclusivity policy under which it would only work
with Tier 1 suppliers who were not developing (or were no longer developing) non-Mobileye
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ADAS. While this policy change resulted in the loss of some partners (e.g., Autoliv), it led
the remaining partners (e.g., TRW) to emphasize the development of complementary parts
(i.e., non-camera technology) for a Mobileye-centered ADAS system while deemphasizing de-
velopment of substitutes for Mobileye’s vision technology. The success of automotive vision
technologies depends on the technology’s ability to accurately identify objects under varied
driving conditions and accurate identification requires an object identification database that
improves with extensive in-field use of the technology. Over time, then, the cost to a Mobil-
eye current partner of repositioning itself to be a direct competitor of Mobileye is increasing,
and, hence, Mobileye’s policy change arguably benefits Mobileye by reducing the field of
potential vision-technology competitors despite exploding ADAS demand.
Despite the importance of repositioning costs, the implications of this construct have received limited
attention in studies of the competitive interplay between incumbents and entrants (Menon and Yao,
2017).
In an attempt to address this void, this paper explores how repositioning costs affect firms’ decisions
and the associated profits in a competitive entry environment. To this end, we first develop a base-
line model that builds on the pioneering work by Ghemawat (1991) on firm’s commitment to making
irreversible capacity decisions, but extends it to the positioning context with differentiated firms. The
model consists of one incumbent (she) and one entrant (he), where the incumbent is the market leader
and initially a monopoly. Prior to the entry of the new firm, the incumbent has the best possible market
position; however, after arrival of the entrant, the incumbent can adjust her position in order to differen-
tiate herself from him. The repositioning costs of this adjustment depend on the incumbent’s ability to
change her activities, which we term “repositioning ability.” When a firm has a strong repositioning abil-
ity, repositioning costs will be lower, for a given degree of repositioning. This ability may be related to a
firm’s possession of advanced machinery or technologies that facilitate the reconfiguration of its business
processes (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). The repositioning ability of an incumbent may be low for a
variety of reasons such as existing commitments. Examples here include Apple’s iPhone’s commitment
to use its own operating system and distribution channel (Ghemawat, 1991; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003;
Pacheco-De-Almeida et al., 2008), newspaper businesses unable to reposition when Craigslist enters the
local market (Seamans and Zhu, 2017), and Loblaw Companies Limited, a major grocery chain in Cana-
da, that built large superstores before Walmart entered the market and could not efficiently switch to a
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small store format (Besanko et al., 2009).
Repositioning costs are an important influence on the competitive interactions between incumbents
and entrants. In the case of an exogenous entrant position, the incumbent’s profit always increases
when she possess a superior repositioning ability, which allows her to efficiently differentiate herself from
the entrant. When the entrant position is endogenous, however, the incumbent’s superior repositioning
ability also reduces the need for the entrant to differentiate, thus increasing competitive pressure on
the incumbent and potentially reducing incumbent profit. These different outcomes result in two key
implications. First, the entrant’s equilibrium profit can increase rather than decrease in relation to the
incumbent’s repositioning ability. That is, contrary to the intuition that a firm benefits from competing
with a weak rival, as opposed to a strong one, the new entrant’s performance can actually be worse
when his rival, the incumbent, becomes weaker in her repositioning ability. Second, the incumbent faces
less competition when her repositioning ability is lower. Thus, if the benefit from reduced competition
is greater than the loss due to lower repositioning ability, the incumbent can be better off. As a result,
despite the extra repositioning costs incurred by the incumbent, the incumbent can still earn more profit
than the entrant. Interestingly, the incumbent’s relative advantage, defined as the incumbent’s relative
performance over the entrant (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988, 1998; Lehmann-Grube, 1997), prevails,
especially when the incumbent’s repositioning ability is relatively low. In other words, the incumbent’s
low repositioning ability can serve as a relative advantage, which is often an important strategic concern
for firms (Barney, 1991; Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky, 2007; Chatain and Zemsky, 2007; Drnevich
and Kriauciunas, 2011; Alcácer et al., 2015).
Entrants are often unable to precisely assess the incumbent’s repositioning ability due to the preva-
lence of cognitive biases, systematic errors in how executives process information in strategic decision
making (Schwenk, 1984; Horn et al., 2005; Menon, 2017; Menon and Yao, 2018). Cognitive bias prevents
managers from completely avoiding errors in estimating a competitor’s ability (Prescott and Visscher,
1977; Camerer, 1991; Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Goldfarb and Yang, 2009). For example, using con-
trolled laboratory studies, Moore and Cain (2007) and Cain et al. (2015) find that entrants to a market
tend to systematically overestimate or underestimate the skills of their rivals. In a similar vein, using
the data from US local telephone markets shortly after the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Goldfarb
and Xiao (2011) demonstrate that a new entrant’s ability to predict incumbent’s behavior varies and
depends on the manager experience and education of the new entrant. Similar bias exists for diversify-
ing entrants as well as de novo ones. In the early 1990s, when Anheuser-Busch diversified to enter the
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snack food business, the beer giant greatly underestimated the repositioning ability of the incumbent,
Frito-Lay, which efficiently repositioned itself (Stalk Jr and Lachenauer, 2004; Horn et al., 2005).
Against this backdrop, we develop our main model characterizing a biased entrant who either un-
derestimates or overestimates the repositioning ability of the incumbent. We use the terms “underesti-
mation bias” (“overestimation bias”) when the entrant underestimates (overestimates) the incumbent’s
repositioning ability. Consistent with intuition, entrant bias leads to suboptimal positioning decisions,
inevitably decreasing the entrant’s performance. We find, however, that entrant bias can either increase
or decrease the incumbent’s performance, depending on the type of bias. In particular, the entrant’s
underestimation bias helps the incumbent, whereas the overestimation bias hurts her. Interestingly,
overestimation bias can harm the incumbent more than it does the entrant. One implication of this
result is that the entrant’s overestimation bias can boost his performance relative to that of the incum-
bent, while underestimation bias does not; overestimation bias can thus confer a relative advantage to
the entrant.
In the discussion so far, we have assumed that the incumbent is unbiased and can fully foresee the
entrant’s bias (consequently the entrant’s actions). However, incumbents can inaccurately assess the en-
trant’s decisions. For example, Harley Davidson as an incumbent motorcycle manufacturer inaccurately
assessed Honda’s entry into the US lightweight motorcycle segment during the early 1960s (Pascale and
Christiansen, 1989; Menon, 2017). In our context, this can mean that the incumbent is either unaware
of entrant bias or inaccurately perceives the level of entrant bias, despite having awareness. Although
the entrant is biased on some level, the incumbent behaves as though the entrant were unbiased or
differently biased.
Given these misperceptions, we first investigate a setting where the incumbent does not accurately
assess entrant bias, despite having an awareness of entrant bias, i.e., entrant bias anticipated by the
incumbent is different from the actual bias of the entrant. In this setting, we find that, although
incumbent bias unanimously results in self harm, ironically it can boost the incumbent’s performance
relative to that of the entrant. That is, compared to the case where the incumbent perfectly assesses
entrant bias, the biased incumbent can achieve a higher relative performance. To clarify, incumbent bias
can be a drag not only for the incumbent, but also the entrant. The drag for the entrant can be greater
than the incumbent’s losses due to her decision bias, enhancing the leader advantage. Perhaps more
interestingly, in this setting where neither the incumbent nor the entrant has an accurate assessment of
the other, both firms can actually earn more than in the baseline model where both firms are accurate.
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This means that, although the respective biases of the incumbent and the entrant always result in harm
to the individual firm, firms can be better off when they both behave in a biased rather than an unbiased
way.
We further consider a setting in which the incumbent is completely unaware of the entrant’s decision
bias, rendering her even more biased. Interestingly, this increased bias does not necessarily inflict further
self harm on the incumbent. In fact, the incumbent’s complete lack of awareness can simultaneously
benefit both the incumbent and the entrant, leading to better performances for both firms compared to
the case where the incumbent is aware of entrant bias (but with an inaccurate assessment), depending
on the magnitude of entrant’s and incumbent’s respective biases.
The Literature and Our Contributions
This paper contributes to the literature on incumbent strategies in response to entrants entering the
market. These responses are among a firm’s most important strategic decisions and have long been a
central issue in economics, strategy, and marketing (Modigliani, 1958; Dixit, 1979; Milgrom and Roberts,
1982; Economides, 1984; Donnenfeld and Weber, 1995; Hauser and Shugan, 2008; McCann and Vroom,
2010). Recent studies have focused on one post-entry defending strategy of the incumbent, repositioning,
and conclude that repositioning costs are fundamental to strategic interactions of firms’ activity systems
(Ellickson et al., 2012). To model this, our baseline model follows the tradition of Hotelling (1929)
and numerous other works he inspired (e.g., Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, Thomas and Weigelt 2000, and
Alcácer et al. 2015). In Hotelling’s model without repositioning costs, each firm’s equilibrium strategy is
to locate at the ends of the market, maximally differentiating itself from the competitor (d’Aspremont
et al., 1979). Most real-world examples, however, act in a manner more consistent with our theoretical
predication that firms are not necessarily located at the two ends of the Hotelling line. This paper
accordingly helps reconcile the gap between theory and practice. Our baseline model also shows that
a higher repositioning ability can translate to a higher profit for the entrant (competitor), but a lower
(absolute and relative) profit for the incumbent.
Although anticipating and studying competitor moves is a key aspect of strategy practice, the formal
modeling of repositioning costs in strategy began only recently with Menon and Yao (2017). Their
“starting point is Pankaj Ghemawat’s (1991) theory of commitment as the essential element in identifying
strategic choices. Ghemawat persuasively argues that a strategic choice is one that involves commitment
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and that committed choice creates the persistent pattern of action typically characterized as strategy.”
Following this argument, Menon and Yao (2017) analytically investigate the interaction between an
incumbent (innovator) and an entrant (follower). Within their setting, the incumbent develops and
introduces a new product generation and then chooses to offer either generous or stingy licensing terms
to a follower who can imitate the innovation or become a complementor. The follower’s choices are
modeled as involving possible repositioning costs because the activity systems supporting imitation
versus complementarity are different. We complement this pioneering research by investigating the
post-entry repositioning of the incumbent, one prevalent strategy in practice.
More importantly, we focus on settings where the entrant and the incumbent are not necessarily
rational and may have different levels of foresight. This follows the idea that “there has long been a
recognition in game theory that an empirically realistic treatment of the problem of strategic interaction,
one that can account for real-world outcomes of strategic interactions, will have to take into account
the beliefs and cognitions of the actors involved” (Menon, 2017). When firms’ biases are considered,
this leads to counter-intuitive results on firms’ absolute performance. First, although entrant bias and
incumbent bias (unawareness) always hurt the entrant and incumbent, respectively, both firms can earn
more than in our baseline setting where both are fully cognizant of the other. Second, as opposed to
the case where the incumbent is fully unaware of entrant bias, the incumbent is not necessarily better
off by being aware (but with an inaccurate assessment) of this bias. Indeed, both the incumbent and
the entrant can be hurt by the incumbent’s awareness.
Also relevant to our work here is the rich literature on leader or follower relative performance, which
forms the basis for the definition of relative advantage, a major area of research in the field of strategic
management (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Barney, 1991; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998;
Kerin et al., 1992; Golder and Tellis, 1993; Tyagi, 2000; Hawk et al., 2013). We enrich this literature
by incorporating repositioning costs and decision biases into a classical model with differentiation and
market entry. By doing so, we make three key contributions. First, we find that, despite intuition to
the contrary, the incumbent can gain more profit than the entrant when the incumbent’s repositioning
ability is relatively low rather than high. The incumbent’s repositioning costs can serve as a leader
advantage. In other words, when the incumbent’s repositioning ability benefits herself, it may also
benefit the entrant the same or even more. This result contributes to the literature which often focuses
only on the impacts of the dynamic capability (or repositioning ability) on the focal firm’s absolute
performance (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Second, although the entrant’s estimation bias always
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hurts the entrant, this bias can enhance the advantage of the entrant (as a follower) relative to the
incumbent. Third, the relative advantage of the incumbent is not necessarily lower than that of the
entrant when she is biased versus unbiased in perceiving the entrant’s action. The incumbent’s lack of
awareness as a decision bias can actually help her own relative advantage. In summary, the repositioning
ability and awareness of the leader are not necessarily a leader advantage, whereas the estimating bias
of the follower can be a follower advantage.
Baseline Model
We develop our baseline model with an unbiased entrant and incumbent based on the standard Hotelling’s
formulation (Hotelling, 1929; d’Aspremont et al., 1979). In particular, we consider a market where
the ideal points of customers are distributed uniformly in [−0, 5, 0.5], and consumers with ideal point
t ∈ [−0.5, 0.5] value a firm of position x: R−(x−t)2. Here, the firm’s position x can be either geographic,
as in a store’s or a restaurant’s physical location or a space of preferences, as in the sweetness of a soft
drink. R is the reservation price of customers, which is assumed to be the same for all customers, and
high enough so that all customers buy from the firm. (x − t)2 is the disutility incurred by consumers
if they are geographically distant from the firm or their ideal product does not match the product of-
fered by a firm. The above framework or similar ones have been widely adopted in the literature of
position/price competition (Tyagi, 2000; Sajeesh and Raju, 2010; Liu and Tyagi, 2011).
Before the new entrant enters the market, the incumbent is the monopoly in the market. For
a monopoly firm positioning at x and pricing at p, the valuation of consumers with ideal point t is
R − (x − t)2 − p. Consequently, the total disutility for all consumers ∫ 0.5−0.5(x − t)2dt = 112 + x2. The
incumbent (monopoly) positions at the best position x = 0, where the consumers total disutility is
minimized (Makadok and Ross, 2013).
After the entrant enters the market, the incumbent can move its original position to a new one xi
but will incur a cost
k|xi − 0| = k|xi|, (1)
where k(≥ 0) is the repositioning parameter. The repositioning costs described in (1) increases with
respect to repositioning distance |xi|. In other words, the repositioning costs are distance-based (Mont-
gomery and Wernerfelt, 1988) and increases with the firm’s distance between the origin (the initial
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position from which the incumbent is moving) and destination (the position to which the incumbent is
moving). Such costs often reflect changes in the set of resources and capabilities required to execute the
origin versus destination activity systems, or account for difficulties in changing from the initial activity
system of the firm, for example, difficulties in unwinding and changing current operations and related
commitments (Upton, 1995; Menon and Yao, 2017).
The parameter k in (1) can represent the incumbent’s repositioning ability: the higher is k, the lower
is the repositioning ability. For example, k = 0 represents the full flexibility for repositioning that is
costless, whereas k = +∞ is the extreme where the incumbent incurs an infinite cost for repositioning.
After the incumbent chooses her new position, the incumbent and new entrant decide their prices
pi and pe simultaneously so that the firms maximize their own profits. This follows the long traditional
argument in the literature of position competition (Hotelling, 1929; d’Aspremont et al., 1979; Makadok
and Ross, 2013) that price decisions are believed to be more flexible than position decisions; price can
be easily changed, but it is often difficult to adjust strategy or product positions. We also follow the
traditional approach in this literature to solve the problem backward by first evaluating firms’ price
decisions and then solving their re/positioning decisions. Given the incumbent position xi and price pi
as well as the entrant position xe and price pe, consumers make their purchasing decisions. For the sake
of presentation, we present the case where only the new entrant repositions herself to the right of the
incumbent (xi < xe). The case of xi > xe is discussed in Appendix A.
Given xi < xe, the customers with ideal point t such that R− (xi− t)2− pi > R− (xe− t)2− pe ⇐⇒
t < pe−pi2(xe−xi) +
xi+xe
2 purchase from the incumbent. Otherwise, consumer purchase from the entrant.
Consequently, the demand of the incumbent firm Di and the demand for the new entrant De are
(Di, De) =
(1
2 +
pe − pi
2(xe − xi) +
xi + xe
2 ,
1
2 −
pe − pi
2(xe − xi) −
xi + xe
2
)
. (2)
The incumbent and the entrant’s pricing problems are therefore
max
pi
(pi − c)
(1
2 +
pe − pi
2(xe − xi) +
xi + xe
2
)
and max
pe
(pe − c)
(1
2 −
pe − pi
2(xe − xi) −
xi + xe
2
)
, (3)
respectively, where c(≥ 0) is the unit production cost for both firms. Solving (3), we obtain equilibrium
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prices and demands for the incumbent and the new entrant:
(pi, pe) =
(
c+ (xe − xi)(3 + xi + xe)3 , c+
(xe − xi)(3− xi − xe)
3
)
. (4)
Note that the profit margins of both firms pi − c and pe − c increase in their position difference xe − xi,
which means that differentiation between positions has a potential to boost the margins, and conse-
quently profits for both firms.
Given (3)-(4), we next solve the incumbent repositioning problem:
piki (xe) : = maxxi (pi − c)
(1
2 +
pe − pi
2(xe − xi) +
xi + xe
2
)
− k|xi|
= max
xi
(xe − xi)(3 + xi + xe)2
18 − k|xi|. (5)
In solving (5), the incumbent would like to position herself close to position x = 0 to limit her repo-
sitioning costs. Moreover, positioning closer to x = 0 is more efficient. In addition, if the incumbent
can either observe or foresee the entrant’s position xe, the incumbent also would likely differentiate
herself from the entrant for a higher differentiation (xe − xi). Overall, the incumbent needs to balance
repositioning costs, position efficiency, and differentiation all together to reach the optimal position xki .
Next, we characterize the incumbent’s optimal position level xki and the associated incumbent’s profit
piki (xe) in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Given the entrant’s position xe(> 0):
a) The incumbent’s optimal position is
xki (xe) =
 0 if k >
9−x2e
18
−6−xe+
√
(3+2xe)2+54k
3 (< 0) if k ≤ 9−x
2
e
18 .
(6)
Moreover, ∂x
k
i (xe)
∂k > 0 and
∂xki (xe)
∂xe
> 0 when k ≤ 9−x2e18 .
b) The incumbent’s optimal profit piki (xe) satisfies
∂piki (xe)
∂k < 0 and
∂piki (xe)
∂xe
> 0.
Lemma 1a shows that, when the entrant enters the market, it is optimal for the incumbent to remain
at the original position if the repositioning parameter is relatively high (k > 9−x
2
e
18 ). However, when the
repositioning parameter is relatively low (k ≤ 9−x2e18 ), the incumbent repositions herself, and distances
herself from the entrant for a higher differentiation in order to lessen price competition. That is, xki (xe) <
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0. Moreover, the closer the entrant to the incumbent’s original position, the higher the magnitude of the
incumbent’s repositioning |xki (xe)| = −xki (xe). That is, ∂x
k
i (xe)
∂xe
> 0. For the entrant, positioning away
from the incumbent’s original position (x = 0) results in less competition for the incumbent so that the
incumbent’s incentive to reposition is relatively low. Moreover, for a given incumbent position xe, the
incumbent’s new position xki (xe) always increases in her repositioning parameter k, i.e.,
∂xki (xe)
∂k > 0:
the higher the repositioning parameter, the lower the magnitude of repositioning |xki (xe)|. Lemma 1b
shows that the incumbent’s optimal profit increases in the entrant’s position xe (∂pi
k
i (xe)
∂xe
> 0). In this
context, a higher entrant position means a greater distance from the incumbent’s position, benefiting the
incumbent. Moreover, Lemma 1b shows that the incumbent’s profit decreases in her own repositioning
parameter (∂pi
k
i (xe)
∂k < 0), which means the incumbent benefits from her own repositioning ability: the
higher her repositioning ability, the higher her profit, given the entrant’s position.
Anticipating the incumbent’s repositioning strategy, the new entrant accordingly decides his position.
In particular, if the new entrant perfectly foresees the incumbent’s repositioning parameter (k), then he
is able to infer the incumbent’s reposition strategy described in (6). Consequently, the entrant’s profit
in (4) becomes
pike : = maxxe (pe − c)
(1
2 −
pe − pi
2(xe − xi) −
xi + xe
2
)
= max
xe
[xe − xki (xe)][3− xki (xe)− xe]2
18 , (7)
where xki (xe) is from (6). Like the incumbent, the entrant needs to differentiate himself from his rival
(the incumbent) while attempting to position himself close to an efficient position. Moreover, the en-
trant strategically anticipates that his position decision can affect the incumbent’s repositioning decision
(Lemma 1). Thus, although the entrant does not incur repositioning costs directly, his equilibrium
position xke and the ensuing profit pike are affected by the incumbent’s repositioning parameter k. Next,
we characterize the entrant’s equilibrium position xke in Lemma 2 below.
Lemma 2. Let xke denote the solution of (7) for any given k. Then, there exists a repositioning
parameter kˆ such that xke = 1 for k > kˆ, whereas xke increases in k for k ≤ kˆ.
Lemma 2 characterizes the entrant’s equilibrium position xke and how it changes with the reposition-
ing parameter k; see Figure 1 for an illustration. For a relatively large repositioning parameter such
that k > kˆ, repositioning does not happen. Thus, the entrant’s position xke(= 1) is independent of the
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repositioning parameter k. However, for a relatively small repositioning parameter such that k < kˆ, the
incumbent repositions with a new position increasing in k. In other words, as repositioning becomes eas-
ier (k is smaller), the entrant’s position xke becomes closer to (or less differentiated from) the incumbent’s
original position x = 0. In the extreme of costless repositioning (k = 0), the entrant positions himself
at the incumbent’s original position xke = 0 by anticipating the incumbent’s repositioning behavior.
The repositioning parameter kˆ is the value where the incumbent is indifferent to both the non-
repositioning strategy and the repositioning strategy. However, as shown in Figure 1, the entrant’s
position jumps as the incumbent switches from a repositioning strategy to a non-repositioning strategy,
i.e., xk−e < xk
+
e . As the incumbent switches from a repositioning strategy to a non-repositioning strategy
around kˆ, the entrant’s positioning decision is affected significantly. This observation helps explain the
forthcoming propositions.
— Place Figure 1 here —
Proposition 1. When k > kˆ, where kˆ is defined in Lemma 2, the entrant’s equilibrium profit pike = 29 .
However, when k < kˆ, pike decreases in k.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the entrant’s profit pike = 29 is independent of the incumbent’s
repositioning costs when the repositioning parameter is high such that k > kˆ; see Figure 1 for an
illustration. When her repositioning parameter is high, the incumbent does not reposition herself and
does not incur repositioning costs (Lemma 2). However, when the repositioning parameter is low (k < kˆ),
the incumbent repositions herself and the entrant’s profit decreases in k. Stated differently, a higher
repositioning ability of the incumbent can translate to a higher profit for the entrant. This is somewhat
counter-intuitive in the sense that one may expect that the entrant is better off when his rival, the
incumbent, becomes weaker in terms of repositioning ability. When the incumbent’s repositioning ability
is relatively low, the incumbent tends to move away from her current (i.e., the most efficient) position,
leaving the entrant a relatively efficient position. Indeed, in the extreme of costless repositioning (k = 0),
the entrant’s profit reaches the maximal value pike = 89 as shown in Figure 1.
Given the entrant’s equilibrium position and profit, we now turn our attention to the equilibrium
decision of the incumbent. From (6) and Lemma 2, the incumbent’s equilibrium position is
xki :=
 0 if k > kˆ−6−xke+√(3+2xke )2+54k
3 if k ≤ kˆ.
(8)
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That is, when the incumbent chooses to reposition herself (k ≤ kˆ), her equilibrium reposition depends on
the entrant’s repositioning xke . This means that the repositioning parameter affects her own positioning
decision not only directly as indicated in Lemma 1, but also indirectly via the entrant positioning xke .
Lemma 3 below characterizes how xki is affected by the repositioning parameter k.
Lemma 3. The incumbent’s equilibrium position xki increases in k when k < kˆ.
Lemma 3 shows that when repositioning occurs (k < kˆ), the larger the repositioning parameter, the
smaller the repositioning magnitude |xki |. That is, the incumbent’s equilibrium position xki increases in k.
This result is qualitatively consistent with Lemma 2 where the entrant position is exogenous, albeit for an
additional driver. In the case of an exogenous entrant position, the incumbent is reluctant to reposition
because of the high costs associated with a high k. But, when the entrant’s position is endogenous, the
entrant would position himself away from the incumbent with a higher repositioning parameter, putting
less pressure on the incumbent. The low repositioning ability renders a less competitive environment,
and consequently less incentive for the incumbent to differentiate.
After characterizing the incumbent’s repositioning strategy in Lemma 3, we next evaluate the incum-
bent equilibrium profit piki := piki (xke), where piki (·) and xke are defined in (5) and Lemma 2 respectively.
Proposition 2. The incumbent’s equilibrium profit piki = 12 when the incumbent’s repositioning pa-
rameter is relatively high (k > kˆ). However, piki can increase in k when the incumbent’s repositioning
parameter is relatively low (k ≤ kˆ).
Proposition 2 states when the incumbent does not reposition herself (k > kˆ), her profit piki = 12 is
independent of the repositioning parameter k. Moreover, in contrast to Lemma 1, Proposition 2 shows
that in equilibrium with an endogenous entrant’s position, the incumbent can be better off for a relatively
higher k when k ≤ kˆ; a lower repositioning ability can imply a higher incumbent profit. Intuitively, recall
that a relatively high repositioning parameter k would render a less competitive environment for the
incumbent. The magnitude of this benefit, due to reduced competition, can be higher than the losses
due to higher repositioning costs. To illustrate, recall that the incumbent’s switch from a repositioning
strategy to a non-repositioning strategy can significantly affect the entrant’s positioning decision for a
small increase in k around kˆ. As a result, the incumbent can be better off as k increases. This insight
that an inflexible commitment can create advantages to a firm has had a storied tradition in business
strategy (Ghemawat, 1991) along with the application of game theory to social sciences and economics
(e.g., Schelling 1980; Sutton 1991; Chatain and Zemsky 2007). This insight is further elaborated in
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Menon and Yao (2017), who analyze the interaction between an incumbent (innovator) and an entrant
(follower) involving repositioning costs. We extend this insight in a different, yet important setting,
where the incumbent incurs repositioning costs after the competitive entry (Wang and Shaver, 2014;
Seamans and Zhu, 2017).
After characterizing the entrant’s and incumbent’s profits, we evaluate the incumbent’s relative
performance to the new entrant, i.e., ∆k := piki − pike . In our setting, the incumbent firm is the leader of
the market, and she has a pioneering advantage in the sense that the incumbent initially positions herself
at the best market location. However, the incumbent can have lower performance than the entrant.
Proposition 3. When k > kˆ, the incumbent earns more profit than the entrant, i.e., ∆k > 0. However,
when k ≤ kˆ, the incumbent can earn less profit than the entrant, i.e., ∆k < 0.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that, when the repositioning parameter is relatively high (k > kˆ), the
leader advantage prevails. Because the incumbent initially occupies the best market location, her first-
mover advantage remains as the repositioning parameter is high. However, when the repositioning
parameter is relatively small (k ≤ kˆ), although the incumbent firm is more operationally efficient on
repositioning, her leader advantage can disappear because, if repositioning occurs, the incumbent posi-
tions at a less efficient location than the entrant’s location. One implication of this result is that ∆k can
decrease in k as k becomes higher. Counter to intuition, the incumbent’s low repositioning ability can
help her gain relative advantage over her rival. Overall, Proposition 3 states that the incumbent’s lead-
er advantage can disappear when the entrant precisely foresees the incumbent’s repositioning decision.
This begs the question of how the entrant’s foresight affects this result. To explore it, we dive deeper to
study the case of a biased entrant.
Biased Entrant
We now examine the case where the incumbent’s costs are not perfectly known by the entrant. In
particular, the new entrant is biased and behaves as if the incumbent’s repositioning parameter is θk
rather than k where θ ≥ 0. That is, when θ < 1 (resp. θ > 1), the entrant estimates the incumbent’s
repositioning costs as less (more) than they really are, i.e., the entrant overestimates (underestimates) the
repositioning ability of the incumbent. The level of entrant’s underestimation bias can be characterized
by θ − 1, whereas the level of entrant’s overestimation bias can be characterized by 1− θ. In this way,
|θ − 1| indicates the level of estimation bias.
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Given the incumbent’s repositioning parameter k, the biased entrant characterized by the bias pa-
rameter θ anticipates the incumbent’s repositioning decision as
xθki (xe) =
 0 if k >
9−x2e
18θ
−6−xe+
√
(3+2xe)2+54θk
3 (< 0) if k ≤ 9−x
2
e
18θ ,
although the incumbent’s decision is actually characterized by (6). As a result, the entrant solves
max
xe
[xe − xθki (xe)][3− xθki (xe)− xe]2
18 (9)
for his optimal position xˆe(θ), i.e., the solution of (9). Given this, from (6), the incumbent’s new position
is
xˆi(θ) := xki (xˆe(θ)) =
 0 if k >
9−xˆe(θ)2
18
−6−xˆe(θ)+
√
[3+2xˆe(θ)]2+54k
3 (< 0) if k ≤ 9−xˆe(θ)
2
18 .
(10)
We start with the case where the incumbent knows the incumbent’s position xke(θ) before repositioning.
In practice, such knowledge can be obtained from direct observation of the entrant’s strategic position.
When the entrant’s position is unobserved to the incumbent, she may foresee the entrant’s position,
which reflects an awareness of the entrant bias and an accurate assessment of the level of entrant bias.
We relax our assumption later in the sections “Biased Entrant and Imprecise Incumbent” and “Biased
Entrant and Unaware Incumbent.”
Next, we evaluate the equilibrium profits for the incumbent and the entrant. Given the equilibrium
positions xˆe(θ) and xˆi(θ) along with (7) and (5), the entrant’s and the incumbent’s equilibrium profits
are
pˆie(θ) :=
[xˆe(θ)− xki (xˆe(θ))][3− xˆki (xˆe(θ))− xˆe(θ)]2
18 (11)
and
pˆii(θ) := piki (xˆe(θ)) = maxxi
[xˆe(θ)− xi][3 + xi + xˆe(θ)]2
18 − k|xi|, (12)
respectively. Although the entrant behaves as if he is solving (9) for his optimal decision, the entrant’s
profit is characterized by (11) rather than (9). Moreover, although the incumbent is not biased, her
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equilibrium profit can be affected by the bias parameter θ via the entrant’s biased decision xˆe(θ).
Proposition 4. Given the entrant bias parameter θ:
a) The entrant’s equilibrium profit pˆie(θ) decreases in θ when θ > 1, while pˆie(θ) increases in θ when
θ < 1.
b) The incumbent’s profit pˆii(θ) increases in θ.
Proposition 4a shows that the entrant’s profit pˆie(θ) decreases in the bias parameter θ when the
entrant has an underestimation bias (θ > 1), but increases in the bias parameter θ when the entrant has
an overestimation bias (θ < 1). Consequently, regardless of the type of bias, the entrant’s profit decreases
in the level of bias (|θ− 1|). However, Proposition 4b shows that the incumbent’s profit increases in the
bias parameter θ. Essentially, the incumbent prefers the entrant to choose a position that is distant from
her because her profits increase with differentiation. When the entrant underestimates the incumbent’s
reposition ability, he stays away from the incumbent and the incumbent thus benefits from the greater
differentiation. Similarly, when the entrant overestimates the ability, he locates himself close to the
incumbent hoping the incumbent will reposition herself farther away. Given this, we check whether the
entrant’s bias can lead to a higher relative performance for the entrant.
Proposition 5. Define ∆ˆ(θ) := pˆii(θ) − pˆie(θ). Then, when θ > 1, then ∆ˆ(θ) increases in the level of
the entrant’s bias (θ − 1), i.e., θ > 1 =⇒ ∆ˆ′(θ) > 0. However, when θ < 1, ∆ˆ(θ) can decrease in the
level of the entrant’s bias (1− θ).
Proposition 5 demonstrates that the entrant’s underestimation bias (θ > 1) always drags down the
entrant’s relative performance, namely, the follower advantage −∆ˆ(θ). However, the entrant’s overes-
timation bias (θ < 1) can boost his relative advantage over the incumbent. For insights, recall that
when the entrant overestimates the incumbent’s repositioning ability, the biased entrant would like to
position himself closer to the incumbent, putting more competition pressure, a drag, on the incumbent.
When this drag on the incumbent is significant and outweighs the entrant’s losses due to his decision
bias, i.e., when the incumbent’s profit is more sensitive to entrant bias than entrant profit, the entrant’s
relative advantage can be enhanced. Thus, overestimation bias can hurt the incumbent even more than
it does the entrant, and it is possible that the entrant with the overestimation bias can make more profit
than the incumbent even when the unbiased entrant cannot. This is interesting because, given that the
unbiased entrant can foresee the incumbent’s decision, at the least, the unbiased entrant can mimic the
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biased entrant’s decision and earn the same profit as the biased entrant. However, ironically, Proposi-
tion 5 indicates that although the unbiased entrant can increase his own profit by reacting optimally,
his optimal reaction nevertheless can increase his competitor’s profit even more, depending on the type
of entrant bias.
Proposition 5 also implies that the insight when the entrant is unbiased, namely the low repositioning
ability of the incumbent can be a leader advantage (Proposition 3), remains when the entrant is biased
in (under)estimating the incumbent’s repositioning ability. This also means that the entrant (follower)
advantage can persist when the entrant has an overestimation bias while the incumbent incurs reposi-
tioning costs. We can show that, when the incumbent does not incur repositioning costs, the entrant’s
follower advantage is sustained as long as his position is closer than the incumbent’s position to the
center of the Hotelling line (see Appendix A for details).
Biased Entrant and Imprecise Incumbent
So far we have assumed that the incumbent is not only aware of entrant bias, but also has a precise
assessment of that bias. We now extend our analysis to the case where the incumbent’s assessment of
the entrant bias is inaccurate. In particular, although entrant bias is captured by the parameter θ, the
incumbent assesses the incumbent’s parameter as θˆ( 6= θ). As a result, the entrant described by the bias
parameter θ positions himself at xˆe(θ), i.e., the solution of (9). However, the incumbent still positions
herself at xˆi(θˆ), where xˆi(·) is from (10). The entrant’s and the incumbent’s equilibrium profits are
therefore
pˆie(θ, θˆ) :=
[xˆe(θ)− xˆi(θˆ)][3− xˆi(θˆ)− xˆe(θ)]2
18 , (13)
and
pˆii(θ, θˆ) :=
[xˆe(θ)− xˆi(θˆ)][3 + xˆi(θˆ) + xˆe(θ)]2
18 − k|xˆi(θˆ)|, (14)
respectively. The incumbent’s leader advantage is consequently
∆ˆ(θ, θˆ) := pˆii(θ, θˆ)− pˆie(θ, θˆ). (15)
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We next study the impact of the incumbent’s imprecise bias (i.e., the inaccurate assessment of the
entrant’s behavior) on the absolute and relative performances defined in (13)-(15), as we have done
before.
Proposition 6. The incumbent’s imprecise bias always leads to a lower profit for the incumbent, i.e.,
pˆii(θ) ≥ pˆii(θ, θˆ) for any θˆ. However, the incumbent’s imprecise bias can lead to a higher relative perfor-
mance for the incumbent, i.e., ∆ˆ(θ, θˆ) > ∆ˆ(θ) when θˆ > θ.
Proposition 6 shows that, although incumbent bias always leads to a lower profit for the incumbent,
it can actually boost the incumbent’s leader advantage – the incumbent’s performance relative to the
entrant. Although the incumbent’s bias hurts the incumbent, it can hurt the entrant even more than
it does the incumbent when θˆ > θ (see Proposition 7 below), thus boosting the incumbent’s relative
performance.
Proposition 7. The incumbent’s imprecise bias hurts the entrant, i.e., pˆie(θ, θˆ) < pˆie(θ) when θˆ > θ,
but it benefits the entrant, i.e., pˆie(θ, θˆ) > pˆie(θ) when θˆ < θ.
Thus, incumbent bias can either hurt or benefit her rival (entrant) depending on the relative value of θˆ
and θ; entrant bias can also benefit the incumbent (Proposition 4). This raises the question of whether
firms can earn more when they are both biased versus both unbiased.
Proposition 8. Although entrant bias and incumbent bias always lead to lower performance for the
entrant and incumbent respectively, i.e., (pˆie(θ), pˆii(θ, θˆ)) ≤ (pike , pˆii(θ)), biased firms can earn more than
sophisticated firms, i.e., (pˆie(θ, θˆ), pˆii(θ, θˆ)) > (pike , piki ).
Proposition 8 indicates that although entrant bias and incumbent bias are harmful for each individual
firm, each can be better off when they are both biased versus both unbiased. That is, each firm can be
better off by their simultaneous (but not singular) biases. For insights, in our setting, in addition to
repositioning costs incurred by the incumbent, firm performance is affected by their individual locations,
which determine efficiency, as well as their relative location, which determines differentiation. When
the entrant underestimates the incumbent’s repositioning ability, the entrant tends to position himself
farther from the incumbent, benefiting the incumbent. At the same time, incumbent bias can lead
to a distancing of the entrant positioning from the entrant, thus benefiting the entrant. When these
benefits outweigh the losses due to biases, both firms are better off. Consider the case where the
repositioning parameter k = 0. In our baseline model, the entrant’s and incumbent’ equilibrium profits
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are (pike , piki ) = (89 ,
2
9) with the associated equilibrium positions (xke , xki ) = (0,−1). The entrant is hurt
by his own bias because pˆie(θ) ≤ pˆie(θ = 1) = pike (Proposition 4). The incumbent bias also always hurts
herself (pˆii(θ, θˆ) ≤ pˆii(θ)), because the rational incumbent optimally chooses her optimal position in order
to obtain her optimal profit in (12), but the biased incumbent does not in (18). However, if the entrant
expects that the incumbent’s repositioning parameter is higher than kˆ with θ = ∞, then the entrant
positions at xke(θ) = 1 (Lemma 2), while the entrant still positions at xˆi(θˆ) = −1 when θˆ < ∞. As a
result, from (16)-(17), both biased entrant and biased incumbent earn more than unbiased firms, i.e.,
(pˆie(θ, θˆ), pˆii(θ, θˆ)) = (1, 1) > (89 ,
2
9) = (pike , piki ). In this example, we see that the decision biases of the
incumbent and the entrant can lead to a situation where firms are well differentiated. Although such
differentiation can entail less efficient positions (far from the center of the Hotelling line), thus hurting
firms (especially the incumbent originally located at the most efficient position), this example illustrates
that the benefits of increasing differentiation can offset the losses of reduced efficiency for both firms.
Biased Entrant and Unaware Incumbent
In the last section, we investigate the case where the incumbent is biased in assessing the entrant
behavior, i.e., the incumbent is partially cognizant in the sense that the incumbent is still aware of
entrant bias, but has an inaccurate assessment. In this section, we extend our scope to the case with
a more biased incumbent who is totally unaware of entrant bias. The objective of this section is two-
fold. First, we check the robustness of our main insights in section “Biased Entrant and Imprecise
Incumbent,” namely incumbent bias can enhance her relative advantage while hurting the entrant, and
decision biases can lead to a mutually beneficial situation for both firms (Propositions 6-8). Second,
we derive new insights driven by the incremental bias of the unaware (versus aware but imprecise)
incumbent.
We now describe the equilibrium outcome when the entrant is biased and the incumbent is unaware
of entrant bias. For this case, from (8), the incumbent positions herself at xki while expecting the
entrant’s position to be xke . Consequently, the equilibrium positions for the entrant and the incumbent
are xˆe(θ) and xki respectively. For this setting where the entrant has biased estimates of the incumbent’s
repositioning ability (θ 6= 1) while the incumbent is biased in terms of not foreseeing entrant bias, the
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entrant’s and the incumbent’s equilibrium profits are
p˜ie(θ) :=
[xˆe(θ)− xki ][3− xki − xˆe(θ)]2
18 (16)
and
p˜ii(θ) :=
[xˆe(θ)− xki ][3 + xki + xˆe(θ)]2
18 − k|x
k
i |, (17)
respectively. Consequently, the incumbent’s leader advantage is
∆˜(θ) := p˜ii(θ)− p˜ie(θ). (18)
We next study the impact of incumbent bias (unawareness) on both her absolute performance and
relative performance defined in (16)-(18).
Proposition 9. a) The incumbent’s unawareness always leads to a lower profit for the incumbent, i.e.,
pˆii(θ) ≥ p˜ii(θ) for any θ. However, the incumbent’s unawareness can lead to a higher relative performance
for the incumbent, i.e., ∆˜(θ) > ∆ˆ(θ).
b) The incumbent’s unawareness hurts the entrant, i.e., p˜ie(θ) < pˆie(θ) when θ < 1.
c) Although the entrant’s estimation bias and the incumbent’s unawareness always lead to lower per-
formances for the entrant and incumbent respectively, i.e., (pˆie(θ), p˜ii(θ)) ≤ (pike , pˆii(θ)) for any θ, biased
firms can earn more than the sophisticated firms, i.e., (p˜ie(θ), p˜ii(θ)) > (pike , piki ).
Propositions 9a-b show that, although a lack of awareness leads to a lower profit for the incumbent,
this lack of awareness as a decision bias can actually boost the incumbent’s leader advantage while
hurting the entrant. Proposition 9c further shows that, when both firms are biased they can earn more
than unbiased firms. Thus, the main insights from the setting where the incumbent has estimation
bias (Propositions 6-8) continuously hold for a setting where the incumbent has a bias due to a lack of
awareness. Given this, we compare the equilibrium profits for these two settings to evaluate the impact
of the incumbent’s lack of awareness versus estimation bias.
Proposition 10. The increasing bias of the incumbent can benefit both the entrant and the incumbent,
i.e, (p˜ie(θ), p˜ii(θ)) > (pˆie(θ, θˆ), pˆii(θ, θˆ)), when θˆ < 1 < θ.
Proposition 10 shows that both firms can achieve higher profits when the incumbent is unaware of
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entrant bias than when the incumbent is aware (but with an inaccurate assessment) of entrant bias.
When the incumbent foresees an overestimation bias (θˆ < 1), she would expect the entrant to position
himself close to her so that the incumbent has more incentive to reposition than when the incumbent is
unaware of entrant bias, rendering a less competitive environment and benefiting the entrant. Moreover,
when the entrant has an underestimation bias (θ > 1) but the incumbent expects the entrant to have
an overestimation bias (θˆ < 1), the incumbent’s estimation of entrant behavior is so biased that the
incumbent can be better off by being completely unaware of entrant bias. This means that, interestingly,
the incumbent’s (increasing) bias can even benefit the incumbent, per se, which differs from our previous
result that a firm’s own bias always hurts the firm (Propositions 4, 6, and 9). Indeed, Proposition 10
shows that with increasing bias the incumbent can benefit both herself and the entrant, depending on
incumbent bias and entrant bias.
Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates an incumbent’s repositioning costs and associated decision biases within a market
entry setting. To this end, we first explore a baseline setting where both the incumbent and entrant are
unbiased; the entrant perfectly assesses the incumbent’s repositioning ability, and the incumbent also
knows the entrant’s assessment. We find that the incumbent’s repositioning ability can benefit, rather
than harm the entrant, and can harm, rather than benefit, the incumbent. This opens the opportunity for
the new entrant to perform better than an incumbent with a relatively high repositioning ability, which
implies that the incumbent’s repositioning ability does not necessarily contribute to a leader advantage.
In addition to being a clean engine to think about repositioning costs and strategic interactions, this
baseline model also has the potential to bring a fresh perspective to other applied phenomena. For
example, consider strategic interactions between (multinational) firms competing across geographies,
where the transfer of learning plays an important role (Kalnins and Mayer, 2004; Alcácer and Zhao, 2012;
Alcácer et al., 2015; Seamans and Zhu, 2017). Suppose the incumbent (entrant) has a sister incumbent
(sister entrant) owned by the same parent corporation. If the sister incumbent has experience with the
entry of the sister entrant, then the incumbent’s own repositioning costs can be significantly reduced as a
result of learning across sister units (Alcácer et al., 2015; Seamans and Zhu, 2017). In such a context, our
analysis indicates that reduced repositioning costs can lead to (i) lower performance for the incumbent,
and (ii) a greater benefit for the entrant than for the incumbent because the incumbent’s relative
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performance is reduced (rather than enhanced). In sight of our results, researchers and practitioners
should consider beyond the positive or negative effect of repositioning ability on the focal incumbent
firm’s absolute performance, which is the primary focus of the existing literature; they should also
consider the possible negative effect on her relative performance vis-á-vis competitive entrants, which is
often an important strategic concern for firms (Barney, 1991; Chatain and Zemsky, 2007; Drnevich and
Kriauciunas, 2011; Alcácer et al., 2015).
In order to investigate the impact of decision bias on the dynamics between incumbents and entrants,
we consider an entrant with either overestimation or underestimation bias regarding the incumbent’s
repositioning ability. In a setting with a rational incumbent, who is not only aware of entrant bias, but
also has an accurate assessment of his bias, we find it is possible that the biased entrant can make more
profits than the incumbent, while an unbiased entrant cannot. That is, entrant bias can be a relative
advantage for the entrant. In particular, we find that, although underestimation bias never helps the
entrant gain better relative performance, overestimation bias does. This insight is a contribution to
the literature on bias in estimating the skill of others (e.g., see Moore and Cain 2007 Goldfarb and
Xiao 2011, and Cain et al. 2015), which is often considered detrimental. For example, Anheuser-
Busch underestimated the repositioning ability of the incumbent (Frito-Lay), whose helm was just taken
by Roger Enrico (Stalk Jr and Lachenauer, 2004), leading to a significant loss for Anheuser-Busch.
If Anheuser-Busch had overestimated (rather than underestimated) the incumbent, then our analysis
indicates that, although the overestimation bias would still have been harmful for Anheuser-Busch, it
could have actually hurt Frito-Lay more, thus boosting Anheuser-Busch’s relative advantage.
Presumably, an incumbent can also be biased with regard to her expectations of the entrant’s be-
havior. We find that when the incumbent is biased in her assessment of entrant bias, this can create
a relative advantage for her. A more striking finding is that both the entrant and incumbent can earn
more than in the baseline model where neither firm is biased. Decision bias is therefore not necessarily
detrimental for firms, particularly when both the entrant and the incumbent are biased. We also note
that the incumbent is more biased when she is completely unaware of entrant bias. In this setting, the
incumbent’s increasing bias can interestingly benefit both herself and the entrant.
In the above analyses, we assume that repositioning costs are linear in the magnitude of repo-
sitioning. We introduce one extension along this direction by assuming that repositioning costs are
fixed and independent with respect to the magnitude of repositioning (Appendix B). This may happen
when repositioning is greatly facilitated by flexible manufacturing systems, which consist of comput-
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er numerically-controlled machines and other programmable automation that enable the production of
different products on the same system. Exploring this extension, we find that our insights that repo-
sitioning costs can be a leader advantage for the incumbent (Proposition 13), whereas estimation bias
can be a follower advantage for the entrant (Proposition 15), remain true, although quantitative details
differ depending on the modeling parameters.
Our core argument is that repositioning costs and the associated biases should be central to analyses
of strategic dynamics in the context of market entry and incumbent repositioning. This paper takes
one of the first analytical steps to examine the impact of these factors and generates counter-intuitive
results. Our model sheds new light on the implications of repositioning costs and decision biases with
respect to competitive advantage. While we believe that our analytical results apply broadly to differ-
ent types of post-entry repositioning across different contexts, future work could extend our study to
empirical contexts. For example, future work can follow approaches in the empirical literature (Galas-
so and Simcoe, 2011; Wang and Shaver, 2014, 2016) to classify different decision biases and different
repositioning costs and then accordingly determine market entry decisions and the associated absolute
and relative performances of firms. Such an empirical effort would not only test the predictions of the
current model, but also offer guidelines for the design and adoption of strategies aimed at enhancing
repositioning ability and curtailing the biases of executives.
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Figure 1: The equilibrium position xke and profit pike for the entrant.
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Appendix A: Proofs and Derivations
Justification of (4) When xi < xe, the equilibrium prices of the incumbent and entrant are (pi, pe) =
(c+ (xe−xi)[3+(xi+xe)]3 , c+
(xe−xi)[3−(xi+xe)]
3 ) with associated demands (Di, De) = (
1
2 +
xi+xe
6 ,
1
2 − xi+xe6 ).
When xi > xe, the equilibrium prices are (pi, pe) = (c + (xi−xe)[3−(xi+xe)]3 , c +
(xi−xe)[3+(xi+xe)]
3 ) with
associated demands (Di, De) = (12 − xi+xe6 , 12 + xi+xe6 ). For this case, the incumbent’s profit is
(xi − xe)(3− xi − xe)2
18 − k|xi| (19)
while the entrant’s profit is
(xi − xe)(3 + xi + xe)2
18 . (20)
For both cases xi + xe ≤ 3 holds for non-trivial equilibria with non-negative demands. This is indeed
the case and is checked in the proof of Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 1. a) In this proof, we present the details only for the case xe > 0, and xe < 0 follows
a similar proof.
We first prove that the incumbent’s optimal position is such that xi ≤ 0 when xe > 0. By contradic-
tion, suppose that the incumbent’s optimal decision xi > 0 when xe > 0. We then have two possible cases:
(i) xi < xe and (ii) xi > xe. For case (i), the incumbent’s profit in (5) becomes (xe−xi)(3+xi+xe)
2
18 − kxi.
However, given xi > 0, the incumbent can be better off by positioning at −xi(< xe) with the associated
profit (xe+xi)(3−xi+xe)
2
18 −kxi, because (xe+xi)(3−xi+xe)
2
18 −kxi− [ (xe−xi)(3+xi+xe)
2
18 −kxi] =
xi(9+x2i−x2e)
9 > 0,
where the inequality follows from xi + xe ≤ 3. For case (ii), the incumbent’s profit in (19) becomes
(xi−xe)(3−xi−xe)2
18 − kxi which is less than the incumbent profit ( (xe+xi)(3−xi+xe)
2
18 − kxi) by positioning
at −xi.
We now derive the incumbent’s optimal decision. When xe > 0(=⇒ xi ≤ 0) the objective func-
tion of (5) becomes (xe−xi)(3+xi+xe)
2
18 + kxi, which is concave in xi with the first-order-condition k =
(3+xe+xi)(3−3xi−xe)
18 =⇒ xi =
−6−xe+
√
(3+2xe)2+54k
3 . The solution xi =
−6−xe−
√
(3+2xe)2+54k
3 does not
satisfy xi + xe ≤ 3, and −6−xe+
√
(3+2xe)2+54k
3 ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ k ≤ 9−x
2
e
18 . The incumbent’s optimal solution is
consequently characterized by (6). Moreover, −6−xe+
√
(3+2xe)2+54k
3 increases in k and xe respectively.
b) For any xi, the objective function in (5) decreases in k. From the envelope theorem, the incum-
bent’s optimal profit then also decreases in k, i.e., ∂pi
k
i (xe)
∂k < 0. Moreover, for any xi, the derivative of the
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objective function in (5) with respect to xe (3+xi+xe)(3+3xe−xi)18 is positive because xi+xe ≤ 3 =⇒ xi ≤ 3.
Consequently, from the envelope theorem, the incumbent’s optimal profit also increases in xe, i.e.,
∂piki (xe)
∂xe
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. If the incumbent does not reposition herself (k ≥ 9−x2e18 ), then the entrant’s
profit in (7): pike = maxxe
xe(3−xe)2
18 =
2
9 with the equilibrium entrant position xke = 1. However, if
the incumbent repositions herself (k < 9−x
2
e
18 ), then the entrant’s profit in (7) becomes pie(k, xe) :=
1
18 [xe −
√
54k+(2xe+3)2−xe−6
3 ][3 − xe −
√
54k+(2xe+3)2−xe−6
3 ]2 from (6). Here, pie(k, xe) is supermodular
in k and xe, i.e., ∂pie(k,xe)∂xe∂k =
18[k(2xe−9)+4xe+6]
[54k+(2xe+3)2]3/2
> 0, because 6 + 4xe + k(2xe − 9) > xe[xe(9−2xe)+90]18 +
3
2 > 0 from xi + xe < 3 and k <
9−x2e
18 . The entrant equilibrium position xke therefore increases in k
when the incumbent repositions herself. For a special case of k = 0, the entrant’s equilibrium profit
is maxxe
(xe−xe−33 )(3−xe−33 −xe)
18 =
8
9 with the associated entrant position xke = 0 from xki (xe) =
xe−3
3
(Lemma 1a).
We now establish the existence of kˆ. First, the incumbent repositions (does not reposition) herself
when k = 0 (k = ∞). Second, suppose there exist repositioning parameters k1 and k2(> k1) such that
the incumbent repositions (does not reposition) herself when k = k2 (k = k1). Then, k1 ≥ 9−(x
k1
e )2
18
while k2 < 9−(x
k2
e )2
18 from Lemma 1a. Consequently,
9−(xk1e )2
18 < k1 < k2 <
9−(xk2e )2
18 =⇒ xk1e > xk2e , which
contradicts that xke increases in k.
Proof of Proposition 1. When the incumbent does not reposition herself (k > kˆ), the entrant’s
equilibrium profit is pike = 29 from the proof of Lemma 2. However, when the incumbent repositions
herself (k ≤ kˆ), the entrant’s profit is pie(k, xe) = [xe−x
k
i (xe)][3−xki (xe)−xe]2
18 , where xki (xe) is shown as in
(6). From ∂pie(k,xe)
∂xki (xe)
= − [3+xe−3xki (xe)][3−xe−xki (xe)]18 < 0 and
∂xki (xe)
∂k > 0 (Lemma 1a), pie(k, xe) decreases
in xe for any k, implying the entrant’s equilibrium profit pike decreases in k.
Proof of Lemma 3. From (8), when k < kˆ, dx
k
i
dk =
(3+2xke )
3
√
(3+2xke )2+54k
dxke
dk − 13 dx
k
e
dk =
dxke
dk
(
3+2xke
3
√
(3+2xke )2+54k
−
1
3
)
> 0, because dx
k
e
dk > 0 (Lemma 2) and k <
9−(xke )2
18 <
(3+2xke )2
18 =⇒ 3+2x
k
e
3
√
(3+2xke )2+54k
> 13 .
Furthermore, in equilibrium, xki +xke < 3 always holds because xki +xke increases in k from xke increases
in k (Lemma 2), while xki + xke = 1 when k =∞.
Proof of Proposition 2. When k > kˆ, the equilibrium positions are (xke , xki ) = (1, 0) from the proof of
Lemma 2. As a result, the incumbent’s equilibrium profit piki =
(xe−xi)(3+xi+xe)2
18 − k|xi| = 12 . However,
the incumbent’s profit piki can increase when k ≤ kˆ. It is sufficient to consider the repositioning parameter
around kˆ, where the incumbent does not reposition (repositions) herself when k is relatively low (high),
i.e., k = kˆ− (k = kˆ+). For an instantaneous increase of the repositioning parameter from k− to k+, the
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entrant’s position significantly increases and xkˆ−e < xkˆ
+
e ; see Figure 1. Consequently, as k increases from
k− to k+, the incumbent’s equilibrium profit increases around kˆ, i.e., pikˆ+i (xkˆ
+
e ) > pikˆ
−
i (xkˆ
−
e ), because
piki (xe) increases in xe (Lemma 1b).
Proof of Proposition 3. When k > kˆ, from the proofs of Lemma 2 and Proposition 1, piki = 12 > pike =
2
9 =⇒ ∆k > 0. When k ≤ kˆ, it is sufficient to consider k = 0, where pike = 89 > piki = (xe−xi)(3+xi+xe)
2
18 −
k|xi| = 29 =⇒ ∆k < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. a) We first show that the entrant’s profit pˆie(θ) in (11) is concave in the
entrant’s position xˆe(θ). When the repositioning parameter is relatively low (k < 9−xˆ
2
e
18 ), we define A =√
54k + (2xˆe + 3)2; then g(xˆe, k) := d
2pˆie
dxˆ2e
= 8[729k
2+27k(4xˆe(A+3xˆe)−81−6A)+(2xˆe−3)(2xˆe+3)2(A+2xˆe+3)]
81A3 from
(10). Furthermore, ∂g(xˆe,k)∂xˆe =
16[729k2(4A+18xˆe−9)+(2xˆe+3)4(A+2xˆe+3)+27k(2xˆe+3)(4xˆe(2A+5xˆe+15)+3(4A+69))]
81A5 >
0, and g(xˆe, k)|xˆe=1 = 8[25
√
54k+25+125+27k(2
√
54k+25+69−27k)]
−81(54k+25)3/2 < 0 when k <
9−xˆ2e
18 ≤ 12 . That is, g(xˆe, k) <
0 always holds when k < 9−xˆ
2
e
18 . When the repositioning parameter is relatively high (k ≥ 9−xˆ
2
e
18 ), the
entrant’s profit xˆe(3−xˆe)
2
18 is also concave in xˆe.
We now show that the entrant’s position xˆe(θ) increases in θ. The entrant’s position xˆe(θ) increases
in k (Lemma 2). The entrant also makes decisions based on θk rather than k; see (9). The entrant’s
position xˆe(θ) accordingly increases in θ.
Consequently, the entrant’s profit pˆie(θ) is concave in θ. Since the entrant makes a higher profit when
he is unbiased (θ = 1) versus biased, the entrant’s profit pˆie(θ) decreases (increases) in θ when θ > 1
(θ < 1).
b) From (12), the incumbent’s profit pˆii(θ) is affected by θ via xˆe(θ), which increases in θ from part
a). Moreover, the incumbent’s profit increases in the entrant’s position xˆe(θ) (Lemma 6b). As a result,
the incumbent’s profit pˆii(θ) increases in θ.
Proof of Proposition 5. When θ > 1, pˆii(θ) increases in θ (Proposition 4b) while pˆie(θ) decreases in θ
(Proposition 4a). Thus, ∆ˆ(θ) = pˆii(θ)− pˆie(θ) increases in θ − 1 when θ > 1. When θ < 1,
∆ˆ′(θ)
∣∣∣
θ=1
= pˆi′i(θ)
∣∣
θ=1 − pˆi′e(θ)
∣∣
θ=1
= dpˆii(θ)
dxˆe(θ)
dxˆe(θ)
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=1
− dpˆie(θ)
dxˆe(θ)
dxˆe(θ)
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=1
= [3 + xˆi(θ) + xˆe(θ)][3 + 3xˆe(θ)− xˆi(θ)]18
dxˆe(θ)
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=1
> 0,
where the second equality follows from dpˆie(θ)dxˆe(θ)
∣∣∣
θ=1
= 0 (the envelope theorem). Thus, ∆ˆ(θ) decreases in
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1− θ around θ = 1.
Follower Advantage without Repositioning Costs. Let xai represent the incumbent’s position
after repositioning. Given xai and xˆe(θ), from (11)-(12), the entrant’s profit is pie =
[xˆe(θ)−xai ][3−xai−xˆe(θ)]2
18
while the entrant’s profit is pii = [xˆe(θ)−x
a
i ][3+xai +xˆe(θ)]2
18 if firms engage in a price competition again. As
a result, pie − pii = 2[(x
a
i )2−(xˆe(θ))2)
3 > 0⇐⇒ |xai | > |xˆe(θ)|.
Proof of Proposition 6. The entrant’s profit defined in (12) solves the optimization problem and
consequently is higher than the profit defined in (14). That is, pˆii(θ) ≥ pˆii(θ, θˆ) for any θˆ. We next
compare the relative performances ∆ˆ(θ, θˆ) and ∆ˆ(θ):
∂∆ˆ(θ, θˆ)
∂θˆ
∣∣∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
− d∆ˆ(θ)
dθˆ
∣∣∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
= ∂pˆii(θ, θˆ)
∂θˆ
∣∣∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
− ∂pˆie(θ, θˆ)
∂θˆ
∣∣∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
= − ∂pˆie(θ, θˆ)
∂θˆ
∣∣∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
= − ∂pˆie(θ, θˆ)
∂xˆi(θˆ)
dxˆi(θˆ)
dθˆ
∣∣∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
= [3 + xˆe(θ)− 3xˆi(θ)][3− xˆi(θ)− xˆe(θ)]18
dxˆi(θˆ)
dθˆ
∣∣∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
= [3 + xˆe(θ)− 3xˆi(θ)][3− xˆi(θ)− xˆe(θ)]18
dxˆki (xˆe(θ))
dxˆe(θˆ)
xˆe(θˆ)
dθˆ
∣∣∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
> 0,
where the second equality is from the envelope theorem, the third and fourth equalities are from (13),
the last equality is from (10), and the last inequality is from dxˆ
k
i (xˆe(θ))
dxˆe(θˆ)
> 0 (Lemma 1b) and xˆe(θˆ)
dθˆ
> 0
(the proof of Proposition 4a). We therefore conclude because ∆ˆ(θ, θˆ = θ) = ∆ˆ(θ).
Proof of Proposition 7. From (13),
∂pˆie(θ, θˆ)
∂θˆ
= ∂pˆie(θ, θˆ)
∂xˆi(θˆ)
dxˆi(θˆ)
dθˆ
= − [3 + xˆe(θ)− 3xˆi(θ)][3− xˆi(θ)− xˆe(θ)]18
dxˆi(θˆ)
dθˆ
= − [3 + xˆe(θ)− 3xˆi(θ)][3− xˆi(θ)− xˆe(θ)]18
dxˆki (xˆe(θ))
dxˆe(θˆ)
xˆe(θˆ)
dθˆ
< 0,
where the inequality is from dxˆ
k
i (xˆe(θ))
dxˆe(θˆ)
> 0 (Lemma 1b) and xˆe(θˆ)
dθˆ
> 0 (the proof of Proposition 4a). We
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can therefore conclude because pˆie(θ, θˆ) = pˆie(θ) when θ = θˆ.
Proof of Proposition 8. First, entrant bias hurts the entrant because pˆie(θ) ≤ pike from (7) and (11).
Moreover, incumbent bias hurts the incumbent pˆii(θ, θˆ) ≤ pˆii(θ) from Proposition 6. Second, we show that
biased firms can earn more profit than unbiased firms. It is sufficient to consider k = 0. From (13)-(14),
we find that pˆie(θ, θˆ) = [xˆe(θ)−xˆi(θˆ)][3−xˆi(θˆ)−xˆe(θ)]
2
18 > pi
k
e = 89 and pˆii(θ, θˆ) =
[xˆe(θ)−xˆi(θˆ)][3+xˆi(θˆ)+xˆe(θ)]2
18 >
piki = 29 hold when xˆi(θˆ) is relatively low and xˆe(θ) is relatively high.
Proof of Proposition 9. a) The incumbent who is aware of entrant bias has the equilibrium profit
in (12) pˆii(θ) = maxxi
[xˆe(θ)−xi][3+xi+xˆe(θ)]2
18 − k|xi| ≥
[xˆe(θ)−xki ][3+xki +xˆe(θ)]2
18 − k|xki | = p˜ii(θ). That is, the
unawareness of incumbent leads to a lower profit for the incumbent.
For the relative profit, consider θ = 1 − , where  > 0 is significantly small. As the incumbent be-
comes unaware of entrant bias, the incumbent’s position changes (increases). However, the incumbent’s
loss from unawareness is significantly small (zero from the envelope theorem) because  is significantly
small and θ ≈ 1. However, the entrant’s loss from the incumbent’s position is comparatively large. More-
over, the entrant’s loss dominants the incumbent’s loss and incumbent unawareness helps her relative
performance.
b) When θ < 1, the incumbent unawareness leads to an increasing incumbent position, which hurts
the entrant.
c) First, entrant bias hurts the entrant because pˆie(θ) ≤ pike from (7) and (11). Moreover, incumbent
bias hurts the incumbent p˜ii(θ) ≤ pˆii(θ) from part a) in this proof. Second, we show that biased
firm can earn more profit than unbiased firms. It is sufficient to consider k = 0. From (16)-(17),
p˜ie(θ) = [xˆe(θ)−x
k
i ][3−xki−xˆe(θ)]2
18 > pi
k
e = 89 and p˜ii(θ) =
[xˆe(θ)−xki ][3+xki +xˆe(θ)]2
18 > pi
k
i = 29 hold when xki is
relatively low and xˆe(θ) is relatively high.
Proof of Proposition 10. Since ∂pˆie(θ,θˆ)
∂θˆ
< 0 (the proof of Proposition 7), p˜ie(θ) = pˆie(θ, θˆ = 1) >
pˆie(θ, θˆ) when θˆ < 1. The objective function of (14) shows that the entrant’s profit is concave in
xˆi(θˆ) for any xˆe(θ) from the proof of Lemma 1. For any entrant position xˆe(θ), we define xˆ∗i (θ) =
arg maxxi
[xˆe(θ)−xi][3+xi+xˆe(θ)]2
18 − k|xi|. When θ > 1, xˆe(θ) > xˆe(1) = xke because xˆe(θ) increases in
θ from the proof of Proposition 4. Thus, xˆ∗i (θ) = xki (xˆe(θ)) > xki (xke) = xki because xki (xe) increases
in xe (Lemma 1) and xˆe(θ) > xke . Furthermore, xki = xˆi(θˆ = 1) > xˆi(θˆ) when θˆ < 1 because xˆi(θˆ)
increases in θˆ from the proof of Proposition 7. When θ > 1 > θˆ, xˆ∗i (θ) > xki > xˆi(θˆ), and consequently
p˜ii(θ) > pˆii(θ, θˆ) from (14) and (17).
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Appendix B: Fixed Repositioning Costs
In this extension, we assume that the incumbent’s repositioning costs are independent with the magni-
tude of changes. That is, the incumbent repositioning problem is:
piki (xe) : = maxxi
(xe − xi)(3 + xi + xe)2
18 − 1Ixi 6=0k, (21)
where 1I is the indicator function. If the incumbent repositions herself, then she will incur fixed reposi-
tioning costs k; otherwise, the incumbent does not incur repositioning costs. Next, we characterize the
incumbent’s optimal position level xki and the associated incumbent’s profit piki (xe).
Lemma 4. Given the entrant’s position xe(> 0):
a) The incumbent’s optimal position is
xki (xe) =
 0 if k ≥
(3−2xe)2(12+5xe)
486
xe−3
3 (< 0) if k <
(3−2xe)2(12+5xe)
486 .
(22)
Moreover, ∂x
k
i (xe)
∂xe
> 0 when k < (3−2xe)
2(12+5xe)
486 .
b) The incumbent’s optimal profit piki (xe) satisfies
∂piki (xe)
∂k ≤ 0 and
∂piki (xe)
∂xe
≥ 0.
Anticipating the incumbent’s repositioning strategy above, the new entrant can accordingly decide
his position. The entrant’s profit then becomes
pike : = maxxe
[xe − xki (xe)][3− xki (xe)− xe]2
18 , (23)
where xki (xe) is from (22). We next characterize the entrant’s equilibrium position xke in Lemma 5 below.
Lemma 5. Let xke denote the solution of (28) for any given k. Then, xke = 1 for k > 29 whereas xke = 0
for k ≤ 29 .
Lemma 5 characterizes the new entrant’s equilibrium position and how it changes with the reposi-
tioning parameter k. For a relatively large k (k > 29), the incumbent does not reposition herself and
xke = 1. However, for a relatively small k (k ≤ 29), the incumbent repositions himself, and her new
position is xke = 0. In other words, when the repositioning is getting easier (k is smaller), the entrant
position xke is closer to (or less differentiated with) the incumbent’s original position x = 0.
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Proposition 11. When k > 29 , the entrant’s equilibrium profit is pike =
2
9 . However, pi
k
e = 89 when k ≤ 29 .
Because the incumbent does not reposition herself when the repositioning parameter is high (Lemma 5),
the entrant’s profit pike = 29 when k >
2
9 . However, when the incumbent repositions (k ≤ 29), the entrant’s
profit pike = 89 . That is, a higher incumbent’s repositioning ability (a lower k) can translate to a higher
profit for the entrant.
Given the entrant’s equilibrium position and profit, we now turn our attention to the incumbent.
From (22) and the entrant equilibrium position described in Lemma 5, the incumbent’s position is
xki :=
 0 if k >
2
9
−1 if k ≤ 29
(24)
in the equilibrium. We next evaluate the incumbent’s equilibrium profit piki := piki (xke), where piki (xke)
and xke are from (21) and Lemma 5, respectively.
Proposition 12. The incumbent’s equilibrium profit is piki = 12 when the incumbent’s repositioning
parameter is relatively high (k > 29). However, piki =
2
9 − k when k ≤ 29 .
Proposition 12 shows the incumbent can benefit for a higher k (from k ≤ 29 to k > 29) in the
equilibrium with an endogenous entrant position. This means that higher repositioning costs can imply
a higher incumbent profit. After characterizing the entrant’s and the incumbent’s profits, we next
evaluate the relative performance.
Proposition 13. The incumbent earns more profit than the entrant when the incumbent’s repositioning
parameter is high (k > 29). However, the incumbent can earn less profit than the entrant when the
incumbent’s repositioning parameter is relatively low (k ≤ 29).
Proposition 13 shows that the incumbent makes a higher profit versus the new entrant when his
repositioning parameter is relatively high (k > 29). However, when the repositioning parameter is
relatively small (k ≤ 29), although the incumbent firm is more efficient in repositioning herself, her
position advantage over the entrant can disappear so that she makes less profit than the entrant.
We now study the case where the incumbent’s cost is not perfectly known by the entrant. Given the
incumbent’s repositioning parameter k, the entrant solves the following problem
max
xe
[xe − xθki (xe)][3− xθki (xe)− xe]2
18 , (25)
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where xθki (xe) is the incumbent’s repositioning decision for a repositioning parameter θk, i.e.,
xθki (xe) =
 0 if k ≥
(3−2xe)2(12+5xe)
486θ
xe−3
3 (< 0) if k <
(3−2xe)2(12+5xe)
486θ .
(26)
Given (25)-(26), we next characterize the entrant’s equilibrium position and the associated equilibrium
profit:
pike (θ) :=
[xke(θ)− xki (xke(θ))][3− xki (xke(θ))− xke(θ)]2
18 . (27)
Lemma 6. Given the repositioning parameter k:
a) Let xke(θ) denote the solution of (25). Then, xke(θ) increases in θ.
b) The entrant’s equilibrium profit pike (θ) decreases in θ when he has the underestimation bias (θ > 1),
while pike (θ) increases in θ when he has the overestimation bias (θ < 1).
Given Lemma 6, we next evaluate the incumbent’s equilibrium profit:
piki (θ) := piki (xke(θ)) = maxxi
[xke(θ)− xi][3 + xi + xke(θ)]2
18 − 1Ixi 6=0k. (28)
We next evaluate the impacts of the entrant’s bias on the incumbent’s bias parameter θ.
Proposition 14. The incumbent’s profit piki (θ) increases in θ.
Proposition 14 shows that the incumbent’s profit increases in the bias parameter θ. This implies
that, when the entrant underestimates the incumbent’s repositioning ability (θ > 1), the incumbent’s
profit piki (θ) increases in the level of entrant’s bias θ − 1.
Proposition 15. Define ∆k(θ) := pike (θ)− piki (θ). Then, when θ > 1, then ∆k(θ) decreases in the level
of the entrant’s bias (θ − 1), i.e., θ > 1 =⇒ d∆k(θ)dθ > 0. However, when θ < 1, ∆k(θ) can increase in
the level of the entrant’s bias (1− θ).
Proposition 15 shows that the entrant’s underestimation bias (θ > 1) always drags down the entrant’s
relative performance, namely, the follower advantage ∆k(θ). However, the entrant’s overestimation bias
(θ < 1) can boost the entrant’s follower advantage.
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Proofs of Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 4. a) If the incumbent does not reposition, then her profit is xe(3+xe)
2
18 . However, if
the incumbent repositions herself, then her profit is maxxi
(xe−xi)(3+xi+xe)2
18 −k. For the second case, the
first-order-condition yields xi = −3−xe or xi = xe−33 . Note that xi = −3−xe leads to piki (xe) = −k < 0,
whereas piki (xe) =
2(3+2xe)3
243 − k when xi = xe−33 . Consequently, xi = xe−33 is the unique solution if
2(3+2xe)3
243 − k > xe(3+xe)
2
18 ⇐⇒ k < (3−xe)
2(12+5xe)
486 . Otherwise, the incumbent does not reposition and
xi(k, xe) = 0. Last, xi = xe−33 increases in xe.
b) When k is relatively low (k ≤ (3−2xe)2(12+5xe)486 ), the incumbent’s profit xe(3+xe)
2
18 increases in xe.
However, when k is relatively high (k > (3−2xe)
2(12+5xe)
486 ), the incumbent’s profit
2(3+2xe)3
243 − k decreases
in k and increases in xe.
Proof of Lemma 5. From Lemma 4, we know that when k ≤ (3−2xe)2(12+5xe)486 , the incumbent’s position
is xi = xe−33 . As a result, the entrant’s profit
8(3−xe)2(3+2xe)
243 has the first-order-solution xe = 0 and the
associated profit 89 . However, as k >
(3−2xe)2(12+5xe)
486 , the incumbent’s position is xi = 0. As a result, the
entrant’s position (3−xe)
2xe
18 has the first-order-solution xe = 1 and the associated profit
2
9 . Since
8
9 >
2
9 ,
we can see that if k < (3−2xe)
2(12+5xe)
486
∣∣∣
xe=0
= 29 , then the optimal entrant’s decision is xke = 0. However,
(3−2xe)2(12+5xe)
486
∣∣∣
xe=1
= 17486 <
2
9 . Thus, when k >
2
9 , k >
(3−2xe)2(12+5xe)
486
∣∣∣
xe=1
, and the optimal entrant
position is xe = 1.
Proof of Proposition 11. When k > 29 , (xe, xi) = (1, 0) =⇒ pike = 29 . However, when k ≤ 29 ,
(xe, xi) = (0,−1) =⇒ pike = 89 .
Proof of Proposition 12. When k > 29 , (xe, xi) = (1, 0) =⇒ piki = 89 . However, when k ≤ 29 ,
(xe, xi) = (0,−1) =⇒ piki = 29 − k.
Proof of Proposition 13. From Propositions 11-12, piki = 89 > pike =
2
9 when k >
2
9 . However, when
k ≤ 29 , piki = 29 − k < pike = 89 .
Proof of Lemma 6. a) When k < (3−2xe)
2(12+5xe)
486θ , the incumbent’s position is xi =
xe−3
3 . The entrant
therefore has the first-order-solution xe = 0 with the associated profit 89 . As k ≥ (3−2xe)
2(12+5xe)
486 , the
incumbent’s position is xi = 0. As a result, the entrant has the first-order-solution xe = 1 and the
associated profit 29 . Since
8
9 >
2
9 , we can see that if k <
(3−2xe)2(12+5xe)
486θ
∣∣∣
xe=0
= 29θ , then the optimal
entrant’s decision is xke = 0. However,
(3−2xe)2(12+5xe)
486θ
∣∣∣
xe=1
= 17486θ <
2
9θ . Thus, when k >
2
9θ , the
optimal decision is xe = 1. Consequently, xke(θ) increases in θ.
b) When k > 29θ , xke(θ) = 1 and
(3−2xe)2(12+5xe)
486
∣∣∣
xe=1
= 17486 . However, when k <
2
9θ , xθe(k) = 0.
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Consequently, (3−2xe)
2(12+5xe)
486
∣∣∣
xe=0
= 29(>
17
486).
We first analyze the case of θ > 1 so that 29 >
2
9θ . We have two subcases: (i)
17
486 <
2
9θ . For
this subcase, (xe, xi) = (0,−1) and (pie, pii) = (89 , 29 − k) if k < 29θ ; if k > 29θ , then (xi, xe) = (1, 0)
and (pie, pii) = (29 ,
8
9 − k). (ii) 17486 > 29θ . For this subcase if k < 29θ then (xe, xi) = (0,−1) and
(pie, pii) = (89 ,
2
9 − k); if 29θ < k < 17486 then (xe, xi) = (0,−23) and (pie, pii) = (160243 , 49243 − k); if k > 17486 then
(xe, xi) = (1, 0) and (pie, pii) = (29 ,
8
9 − k). We now analyze the case of θ < 1 so that 29 < 29θ . If k < 29
then (xe, xi) = (0,−1) and (pie, pii) = (89 , 29 − k); if 29 < k < 29θ then (xe, xi) = (0, 0) and (pie, pii) = (0, 0);
if k > 29θ then (xe, xi) = (1, 0) and (pie, pii) = (
2
9 ,
8
9). As a result, when θ > 1,
(pike (θ), piki (θ)) =

(
8
9 ,
2
9 − k
)
if k ≤ 29θ(
160
243 ,
49
243
)
if 29θ < k ≤ 17486(
2
9 ,
8
9
)
if k ≥ max{ 29θ , 17486}.
(29)
However, when θ < 1,
(pike (θ), piki (θ)) =

(
8
9 ,
2
9 − k
)
if k ≤ 29
(0, 0) if 29 < k ≤ 29θ(
2
9 ,
8
9
)
if k > 29θ .
(30)
We can see that the entrant’s equilibrium profit pike (θ) decreases in θ when θ > 1, whereas pike (θ) increases
in θ when θ < 1.
Proof of Proposition 14. From the proof of Lemma 6, we can conclude.
Proof of Proposition 15. When θ > 1, then ∆k(θ) increases in θ (the proof of Lemma 6). However,
when θ < 1, then ∆k(θ) = 0 if 29 < k <
2
9θ , while ∆k(θ) = −69 if k > 29θ . That is, ∆k(θ) decreases as θ
increases. Accordingly, ∆k(θ) can increase in 1− θ.
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